Sandy Hook Tragedy - Response, Part II

The tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School seems to have offended our sensibilities more than other such tragedies because of the ages of the victims.  But in reality, this tragedy was not significantly different or worse than other such events – innocent lives should never be lost at the hands of a crazed or deranged person.  The term “gun violence” is always a prominent part of stories about these events, and the anti-gunners capitalize on that fact to put their emphasis on the wrong word:  the crux of the problem is violence, not guns.

 

While not the warm and fuzzy, politically correct philosophical ideal, it is nonetheless an absolute fact that it is simply and literally impossible to identify all the people who will do bad things and/or to accurately predict what bad things they will do and/or when and where they will do them.  Period.

 

Since bad things will undoubtedly happen regardless of our wishes, intentions and preventive efforts (because there is no such thing as absolute security, meaning some system/strategy that will protect against any conceivable or possible threat at all times), it behooves us to have the best mitigation, response and recovery strategies in place to protect everything important (meaning people, physical things and information).

 

Security must be considered at least as important and necessary as our attitudes and endeavors related to fire, which we have embraced and incorporated wholeheartedly:  While it is nice to idealize that people and things won’t burn and hope that “…it can’t happen here,”  yet we still design and implement (and pay for) reasonable and sometimes mandated fire protection precautions into our buildings; and install fire control systems and have fire response equipment in our buildings; and have regular fire system inspections; and have extensive fire plans that are reviewed and updated regularly; and have regular fire drills; and have internal personnel properly trained to deal with fires; and have Fire Departments to come and put out fires when they occur; and have plans to maintain and/or resume operations after a fire event. Why is the same not so for security?

 

Why are places with adequate and sufficient fire control systems and procedures not considered “fire traps,” but places with adequate security systems and procedures are considered “armed fortresses?” When I walk into a building and see sprinklers on the ceiling and fire extinguishers at key places and evacuation route maps and “No Smoking” signs on the walls and a fire truck parked outside, I get a feeling of comfort – the thought never crosses my mind that this building must pose some grave fire danger.  Why do we not put commensurate emphasis on security?   Why do we not see alarm systems and CCTV cameras and monitors and uniformed – perhaps armed – security personnel as an indication of concern for our safety and security?

 

Logic and consistency do not seem to be traits held in esteem by anti-gun proponents, because in virtually no other situation do they condemn the tool used in a bad consequence as the cause or culprit:  When a porch pulls away and falls from a house killing/injuring partygoers, the hammer is not blamed.  When a pedestrian is killed by a drunk driver, the car is not blamed.  When an editorial or cartoon is written that enflames and angers the masses, the typewriter/computer is not blamed Only when it comes to guns is the tool rather than the actor condemned.

 

We learned (or should have learned) from Benghazi that diplomatic and bureaucratic and philosophic options are meaningless at the time of an attack, because without proper response capability good people die.  When my family is being threatened with grave harm and I am not present to intervene, I do not want a philosopher or psychologist or social worker or a book of social ills analysis there – I want “…rough men (who) stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.”

 

Sandy Hook Tragedy - Response, Part I

Once again a tragedy involving a firearm has struck the U.S. (Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut); and the aftermath brings the usual spate of comments and solutions to avert such tragedies in the future, most of which deal with additional regulation of guns.  But let’s not forget that most of the rhetoric related to guns and gun laws is spouted by both individuals and media who have little if any true knowledge or experience with either.  Cases in point:

 

Many/most of the current diatribes make frequent use of the terms “assault rifle” and “semi-automatic” and paint them with the same negative brush. In reality, an “assault rifle” (as available to civilians) is nothing more than a cosmetically-different rifle (configured to resemble a military weapon), most of which are “semi-automatic” which simply means that 1 bullet is fired with each pull of the trigger and the next bullet is fed into the firing chamber without manual manipulation (strictly speaking, even a revolver operates in a “semi-automatic” manner!).

 

There are literally tens of thousands of gun-related laws in the U.S., ranging from Federal law to local/municipal law. Virtually every facet of owning, carrying, transporting and using a gun is either directly regulated in some way or is covered under the umbrella of some related law (e.g., a general law relating to disorderly conduct would encompass the act of unnecessarily brandishing a gun).

 

Deliberate gun violence (crime) and inadvertent gun harm (accidents) are not the “epidemic” that might be expected due to the civilian ownership of approx. 300 million guns in the U.S. – approx. 8% of all violent crimes are committed by a person known to have a gun, and approx. .5% (1/2 of 1 percent) of all fatal accidents involve guns.

 

Guns are used approx. twice as often for self-defense as they are to commit crimes; and crime and murder rates are generally lower in states with established concealed-carry laws.

 

Two of the cities with the strictest regulation of gun ownership and possession in the U.S., Washington, D.C. and Chicago, IL, have crime and murder rates involving handguns significantly higher than the national average for the same offenses; and both cities had significant increases in their crime and murder rates after the more stringent gun laws went into effect.

 

There is no way to predict anti-social or psychopathic behavior (the root causes of the vast majority of gun misuse); and there is no way to assure that a person unfit to own, possess or use a gun will never do so.

 

So…guns are not inherently evil, they are simply tools for a variety of purposes; there are sufficient gun laws on the books if they would be administered/enforced strictly and consistently (the vast majority of gun-related crimes are diminished or pled down during criminal proceedings); the vast and overwhelming majority of guns in the U.S. are owned and used lawfully and responsibly.

 

Here is a rhetorical question for the anti-gunners: If guns are so inherently bad, why do you immediately want a gun on scene (in the hands of a trained professional) to respond to and mitigate some evil action?   It would seem that that in itself is a tacit admission that it is not the gun itself that is inherently bad…

The "Environment Conducive to Criminality"

In most states in the U.S., landlords/proprietors have some basic obligation to provide a reasonably safe and secure environment for tenants, patrons and other invitees.  This obligation may arise from specific laws/statutes, or from general laws/statutes relating to negligence, or from case law. 

 

In any event, the obligation to provide a safe environment virtually always uses the concept of reasonable security based on foreseeability as the test for adequacy and sufficiency of security when some incident occurs.  In simple terms, this means that a landlord/proprietor must take the precautions that a reasonable person would take under the same/similar conditions and circumstances after giving due consideration to factors affecting the premises (namely:  the inherent nature of the premises; the history of problems at the premises; the history of problems in the area immediately surrounding the premises; and any industry standards that may exist relating to the premises).  This definition thus presupposes that some “one-size-fits-all” approach to security will usually not be adequate or sufficient since circumstances are different at every premises.  But the single factor which exists in the majority of times when some security incident occurs at some specific place is what I refer to as the “environment conducive to criminality.”

 

Let me here make a disclaimer:  There is no such thing as absolute security (meaning continuous, constant, total, complete and unqualified protection and safety of a given asset) – any security system or strategy can be compromised given sufficient motivation, opportunity and resources.  So, since security breaches can occur even when adequate and sufficient security exists, then the primary purpose of any security strategy is to control as many variables as possible to limit the opportunity for criminal acts to the extent reasonably possible, i.e., make it as difficult as possible for crime to occur successfully. 

 

Except for crimes of passion (which generally occur spontaneously), criminals usually seek 2 conditions when deciding how/when/where to commit a crime:  environment/circumstances which allow greatest probability of the criminal act succeeding; and environment/circumstances which allow greatest probability of committing the criminal act without being stopped, caught or identified.  This means that criminals generally choose the circumstances and places which provide the greatest opportunity for successful accomplishment of the crime – they choose a place which has an “environment conducive to criminality.”

As noted above, every place is different and has different conditions to consider when determining security needs.  But regardless of place or conditions, an “environment conducive to criminality” usually has some common traits:

• no formal or careful consideration has been given to security needs (nothing has been done to assure that appropriate security measures have been implemented commensurate with foreseeable threats)
• no formalized security plan exists (security measures, if any even exist, have been chosen and applied haphazardly with no formal strategy or objective)
• area has easy access (a place which has a perimeter which cannot readily be secured or which has access controls which can be easily defeated)
• area is unkempt (making it difficult to determine if something is missing or providing places to hide or move furtively)
• area is dark (a place where crime can occur undetected and persons cannot be readily seen or identified)
• area is not routinely surveilled either by technological means (such as cameras) or persons (a place where crime can occur undetected and persons cannot be readily seen or identified)
• area has no regulatory or warning signage prominently displayed (information is not provided to advise patrons of proper or prohibited behaviors, to publicize security measures as a deterrent to inappropriate/criminal activity, and/or to warn of the penalties for engaging in inappropriate/criminal activity)
• there is no ready security response when problems occur (no plan is in place or competent personnel available to deal with inappropriate persons or activities)
• employees, even those ostensibly having security responsibilities, are not selected or trained properly (personnel are not competent to identify suspicious persons or respond to inappropriate/criminal activity)
• records/documentation related to security are not maintained (history of security issues is not kept or reviewed to ascertain that security measures are adequate and sufficient)
• security is not given adequate management attention (nothing is routinely done to assure that security measures are adequate and sufficient for current or changing security needs)

In summary and conclusion:  When a place fails to identify its security needs and fails to take reasonable steps to provide reasonable security, the result is usually a place where persons go to engage in inappropriate and criminal activities with little concern for being stopped, identified or caught  – a place with an “environment conducive to criminality”.

The Lesson from Benghazi

The tragic – and apparently avoidable – death of an Ambassador and 3 other officials is another grim reminder of both an endemic and systemic problem:  the United States is a reactive country.  And this is a significant problem for both national security strategy and business security.  Loss of life is certainly far more important than the loss of physical or intellectual assets, but the underlying principle is basically the same:  we fail to provide adequate security.

 

As a nation and in the business sector, we tend to be more reactionary than proactive – we have a long history of “not closing the barn door until after the horse has run off.”  We believe that bad things can happen, but only somewhere else or to somebody else;  and even when we recognize that something bad may happen, we rarely expect the worst-case scenario to occur.  We tend to look only at the immediate past for the information with which we make our decisions regarding the immediate future.    So when there are few actual, everyday problems or incidents, security becomes an afterthought and again becomes relegated to the status of “necessary evil.”

 

We fail to recognize that the law of averages and the intent of our enemies will ultimately affect everybody. We rely on our God or Lady Luck or whatever to keep us safe from “the big one.” The security assessors and planners are always viewed as the naysayers,  the ones who bring negativism to the table because, while everybody else is talking about peace and détente and political correctness, the person charged with looking for the bad things will raise his hand and ask “...But what if...?”  And all the shaking heads will turn in that person's direction and his views will be looked on as the ramblings of someone who isn't really with the team or on the bandwagon because "...those things just won't happen to us." But they can...and they will...and they usually do happen.

 

The major cause for having inadequate security is readily apparent:  the people who do the security assessments and create the security plans (in other words, the people who are the most likely to know what to expect) are never the ones in complete control of security. Responsible and accountable and scapegoat-able, yes. In control, no. Why? Because someone else always controls the decision to implement the plans and policies, the money and the resources. Some bureaucrat or executive always has to look at what the security readiness plan will entail and cost and determine – usually in a completely uninformed way – if the imposition of inconvenience and expenditure is really worthwhile, and if the funds and other resources are really most wisely spent on something that may never happen.  So with this fiscal attitude, bolstered by our naïve and erroneous belief that it can't happen to us, the will and the money and the resources we need for truly adequate security are never in place when we need them most – preferably before, but at least at the beginning of some disaster.  And we suffer again.  Needlessly.

 

Both our nation and the business world need to recognize the importance and value of security.  Our post-9/11 world,  coupled with the realities of today’s economy, makes the practice and implementation of adequate security a virtual necessity.  No longer can the protection of our people and our assets be relegated to good fortune and happenchance.  Rather, a systematic approach to assure that everything reasonable is being done to guarantee our nation’s and our business organizations’ safety and financial well-being is of vital and strategic importance.  And the marketing and selling of the concept of adequate protective efforts is a job that must be continually and relentlessly pursued by security professionals, since bureaucrats and executives are most often concerned only with the things that undermine the ability to provide good security.

A Lesson from the Past

I think the adage “If no order, chaos” is truly applicable in the security world – not necessarily to the security function per se, but to the overall concept of security, loss prevention and asset protection within business organizations.

I am old enough to remember the days when order and discipline was the rule of thumb in the business world:  Executives set goals and broad strategies; management made policies and rules to support and implement the strategies; and employees were expected – nay, REQUIRED – to follow and implement the rules and procedures and policies.  Each of those three tiers had its inherent authority, responsibility and accountability.  If a particular person in a particular tier did not properly exercise his role, he would be disciplined – formal discipline on his record, or demotion, or termination.  Everybody clearly understood his particular defined role in the organization, its concomitant responsibilities, and the penalties for failure.  Supervisors and managers were responsible for assuring compliance – they actually supervised and managed.  This was the very concept and essence of ORDER.

In those days, there was far less opportunity for internal security problems within a business organization because there was a defined system of checks and balances, and there were people in place to assure that the system functioned properly and successfully.  The thought and belief was “Even if Big Brother (i.e., Security) was not watching, my boss was.”  I had to perform and behave, or I’d be gone.

Today, that scenario does not exist.  Everybody does everything, so nothing really gets done thoroughly or correctly (another true adage:  “When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible”).  Executives don’t have time to formulate sound goals and strategies because they’re too busy and worried about what is now the end-all and be-all of business: next week’s profits.  So management muddles along, trying to support the executives’ “goal” of next week’s profits.  And the employees do whatever their job-of-the-day happens to be.  EVERYONE gets frustrated.  There is NO sound management or supervision.  So there is lots of time and opportunity to devise devious schemes for “getting my fair share” and doing things in the easiest, simplest way possible, which results in errors and mistakes and an I-don’t-care attitude.   This is the very concept and essence of CHAOS.

Some organizations still focus primarily on “old” security ideas like preventing, mitigating and managing external problems.  But that is because there was a time when focusing on external problems (like theft, trespassing, vandalism, bad checks and credit cards, etc.) was pretty much the sole extent and focus of the security function because there just weren’t that many other issues for Security to be concerned about, because when there was ORDER the internal systems worked and resulted in efficiency, correctness…and low levels of loss.

But now in the land of CHAOS there are many more things to be concerned about in terms of protecting an organization, many (most?) of which are internal, because Security has been charged with cleaning up the mess created by the broken systems that were broken by someone else.  And in order to fix this pervasive problem, we have to first repair the broken windows before we can make sure that they don’t get broken again.

Oh for the simple life of the past……

Value of a Diverse Background

When selecting an organizational security executive, an independent security consultant or a security expert witness, the nature and diversity of the individual’s background should be given thoughtful and careful consideration.

In general, security professionals should have practical rather than (or at least in addition to) theoretical experience. While a knowledge of security concepts and theories is helpful and necessary, it is generally more valuable for a person who will manage or review security operations to have “…been there, done that.” In other words, a professional who has actually worked with the principles he is expected to administer or review (a practitioner) generally brings a more comprehensive perspective than someone who has only studied the principles in theory (a researcher or academician).

In addition, many organizations feel that a person with public law enforcement experience will necessarily make a good security executive, but then do not take into account the nature of the law enforcement experience. With the inherent difference between law enforcement and security – a reactive mindset vs. a proactive mindset – it is important to assure that the law enforcement candidate being considered has some practical experience with the kinds of activities most likely to be encountered in the business setting. This concept holds true in the selection of an independent consultant or expert witness.

As an example, my professional background is unique because it brings a practical knowledge of my field from 3 distinct perspectives: I have served as a Director of Security for 3 organizations, assessing security needs from a subjective standpoint, developing, implementing and managing security programs; I have served as an independent Security Consultant to a wide variety of private and public sector organizations assessing security needs from an objective standpoint, recommending strategies for risk mitigation; and I regularly serve as a court-recognized Security Expert, evaluating adequacy and sufficiency of security programs and operations from a forensic standpoint.

Diverse experience guarantees both broad knowledge and analytical insight.

Process for Conducting Security Assessments

I don’t believe in using anyone else’s form or template for conducting security assessments – each consultant or manager who conducts such assessments has a unique style coupled with his own knowledge and experience; so, as with many things related to security, a “one-size-fits-all” approach usually doesn’t work. But other groups (such as ASIS International and the Federal protective Service) do have some great ideas, so I have incorporated some of those ideas into the forms and procedures that I personally developed for my own use.

In general, I use several background/ “inventory” forms to generate basic information about the grounds/campus, physical facilities, administrative/operational business components, and policies/procedures of the organization for which I am doing the assessment. I have these filled out to the extent possible by organizational representatives prior to my physical inspections/interviews. I then personally conduct a site inspection (to verify all information developed via the background/ “inventory” forms and to assure that nothing important was overlooked), conduct personal and focus group interviews, and review all relevant policies/procedures for adequacy and sufficiency. Finally, I compile all information along with my analyses and recommendations into a narrative report which is the final work product.

During my career this process, along with my experience in serving as a Court-recognized Expert Witness, has confirmed by belief that every place has to be assessed and analyzed separately and independently to fulfill the legal standard for adequate and sufficient security – namely, reasonable security at a particular place and time, under a particular set of circumstances, based on reasonable foreseeability; and thus my process which combines self-developed tools for gathering information along with objective analysis according to the needs and culture of each particular project assures that my assessments are personalized for each client.

I have been using this process for the past 25+ years, and it has served me well.

Preparing for Testimony

Practitioners in the security industry may occasionally be called on to provide testimony in some legal proceeding (either a criminal or civil case; during a deposition or at trial; as a fact witness or an expert). While those practitioners who have served as case consultants and/or expert witnesses will probably have had testimony experience, other security personnel may be faced with giving testimony for the first time. Regardless of the inherent knowledge or expertise of a witness, he/she still needs to be credible, effective and persuasive to the Judge and/or jury. To this end, preparation of the witness is very important.

Each attorney has a unique style and strategy and will undoubtedly have an established procedure for prepping witnesses. But here are a few issues that should be considered by anyone preparing to testify:

(1)  One issue that is sometimes overlooked in the preparation of a witness is the fact that he can only respond to the questions asked (a good witness can sometimes find a way to include additional information, but not always). So close collaboration with counsel is very important, not only to prepare for testimony expected during direct examination at trial, but for anticipated cross-examination. There needs to be a clear understanding and agreement of what information needs to be conveyed, the best manner to convey it, and the best manner to counteract aggressive cross examination, including attacks on both personal credibility and the credibility of testimony.

(2)  Even if not specifically demanded in the deposition or trial subpoena, availability of any relevant case materials/files is a good idea. Specific information such as dates, times and/or other technical information is likely to be a subject at issue, so it is better to refer to notes than to give erroneous information which may later be challenged or used to impeach the witness.

(3)  Answering questions “yes” or “no,” or at least as briefly as possible, is always a good idea. But when such a brief answer is not sufficient – such as when additional clarification or expansion is necessary – it is often best not to begin the answer with “yes” or “no” (such as “Yes, but…”) because an experienced attorney may not allow the “but” portion. Rather, it is sometimes better to begin a longer answer with a qualifying statement such as “Unfortunately, that question cannot be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’, ” then go on with the full answer.

(4)  It is usually helpful for a witness to be advised of the personality and usual strategies/tactics of the opposing attorney. This helps the witness to better prepare for the demeanor and “personality” of the anticipated proceeding (for example, knowing that a particular attorney focuses just as much on the witness’s background as he does on specific case issues). Knowing what to expect from a particular attorney is a great asset for testimony preparation.

(5)  A witnesses should pause briefly before giving any answer, to allow his attorney the opportunity to object before potentially damaging or unnecessary information is inadvertently given.

Testifying in any legal proceeding is often a stressful and challenging ordeal. So having as much information as possible about what to expect, and being as prepared as possible, goes a long way towards doing a thorough, competent and professional job.

"Absolute" vs. "Perfect" Security

“Absolute security” and “perfect security” are not one and the same – the terms are not synonymous. And let’s be clear from the outset: There is no absolute security; and while perfect security may be hypothetically possible at any given moment in time, long-term perfect security is also not possible.

First, some working definitions: Absolute security is the theoretical state of total, complete and unqualified protection and safety of a given asset (some specific person, place or thing, including intellectual “things”). Perfect security is the practical state of utilizing the most appropriate security measures and strategies for a given asset at a given moment in time to protect against immediate, specific threats. A subtle but important difference.

From another perspective: Absolute security would protect against any conceivable or possible threat at all times. This condition simply cannot exist: No security program or strategy can ever totally assure that assets will not be lost or that a legal challenge to security efficacy will not be successful. Depending on a number of uncontrollable variables – such as the commitment, motivation, resources and persistence of an attacker; the inexplicable failure of a protective measure at a crucial moment; or even the whims of a jury – the best security measures may sometimes fail or be deemed to be inadequate. Nothing can be done to assure that nothing will ever happen.

On the other hand, perfect security keeps whoever/whatever is being protected safe right now, from whatever threat is occurring right now. This is attainable, albeit for limited periods of time because situations and conditions change constantly and continuously, and that which is adequate and sufficient right now may not be adequate and sufficient in a few minutes or hours or days. The best that can be hoped for – and what those responsible for security should strive for – is to control as many facets of the security strategy as possible for the longest time possible, and to monitor the strategy continually to assure that emerging threats and unanticipated failures can be best and most expediently mitigated.

As with most issues related to security, one should hope for the best while planning for the worst.

The Value Of A Security Consultant

Many organizations – even, or perhaps especially those with in-house security operations – frequently fail to recognize the benefits of an occasional security assessment conducted by an outside, independent security consultant.

A security assessment of a business is conducted to identify factors which create potential risk to employees, customers, guests and facilities; to analyze and prioritize those potential risks; to analyze current security countermeasures in relation to the identified risks; and to offer recommendations, ranging from physical security measures to security personnel to security policies and procedures, to prevent and/or mitigate as many potential risks as possible. Many organizations have come to realize the value of an outside, independent, objective security audit process – such a review assures that all issues of potential concern have been identified and addressed.

Smaller businesses which do not have a proprietary security operation rightly utilize their local law enforcement agencies to provide basic protective efforts and believe that such involvement is sufficient for their security planning needs, but that is not necessarily the case – law enforcement agencies focus primarily on problem response and resolution, and rarely have the knowledge or experience to conduct thorough assessments of a business’s total security program which should focus primarily on development of prevention and mitigation strategies. While both components – prevention/mitigation and response/resolution – are essential for a thorough security plan, it is obviously much more beneficial to prevent problems whenever possible. So inclusion of the expertise of a security professional is something that should be considered. And in organizations that already have a proprietary security program, an occasional independent security assessment provides a fresh perspective to processes routinely managed by persons who may be too close to the situation to see it clearly and completely.

A security review of any business or security program by a totally independent security consultant, with no affiliations with equipment or personnel providers, can be invaluable in assuring that all security concerns have been identified and addressed in an objective manner, with recommendations geared to the particular needs and circumstances of a specific business.

Difference Between A Security Assessment and A Risk Analysis

The security assessment process is a common method used to determine specific security needs for a specific business based on the issue of foreseeability – the standard that Courts will use to determine if security was adequate and sufficient when security is legally challenged as a result of some incident that has occurred (something bad happens, someone gets hurt, you get sued). Pretty basic.

The security assessment process takes into account 4 specific issues: The inherent nature of the business (every place has its own inbuilt problems and vulnerabilities); the history of problems at the business (while not an exact predictor, past problems at any given place demonstrate the potential for future problems, all else being equal); history of problems in the area surrounding the business (problems which occur in the neighborhood have a tendency to affect everything within the neighborhood; nothing is immune); and industry standards/guidelines/best practices (what has been determined to work in similar places under similar circumstances is at least a good starting point to identify potential security strategies and tactics as related to identified threats and risks). Pretty straightforward for determining foreseeability – that which may occur.

But the concern for being sued shouldn’t be the only reason why a good security program should be part of a sound business plan – it’s just plain good business to maintain a place where assets are protected and employees and customers are safe.

So before a strategy to prevent and mitigate problems is formulated, perhaps we should first remember why security is important in the first place. And that determination can be accomplished by a risk analysis.

Before we begin figuring out why security is important, there are two basic premises that must be clearly understood:

1. There is no such thing as absolute or perfect security: No security program can ever totally assure that bad things will not occur or that a legal challenge will not be successful. Depending on a number of uncontrollable variables – such as the commitment, motivation and persistence of a bad guy; the inexplicable failure of a protective measure at a crucial time; or even the whims of a jury – the best security measures may sometimes fail. So the best that can be hoped for is to control as many facets of the security strategy as possible, and to monitor the strategies sufficiently to assure that unanticipated failures can be best and most expediently mitigated.

2. There are always alternatives to how security measures can be implemented: Because the practice of security is both science and art – the science being the body of knowledge used in protective efforts; the art being the most appropriate application of that knowledge to a given circumstance – there will always be alternate ways to blend the stuff and the applications into a sound, workable and efficient protective strategy.

So here’s what we know thus far:

· Every business and its stuff needs to be protected.

· Every business needs to be concerned about liability.

· Since every business and its stuff is different from everyone else’s business and stuff, efforts to protect anyone’s business and stuff will necessarily be different from the efforts to protect anyone else’s business and stuff.

If we accept these enumerated hypotheses, it becomes obvious that some formal or at least conscious consideration must be given to the development of a security program – if I want to adequately protect my stuff and my liability, I need to consider my situation and develop a security plan accordingly. So how do I do that?  Here’s the outline for our risk analysis:

· If I need to protect my business and my stuff and my liability, I need to know exactly what my business and my stuff and my liability is (these are my “assets” and they include not only my building and equipment but my employees and customers and vendors and my reputation and my business practices and anything else that is valuable to me).

· If I need to protect my business and my stuff and my liability, I need to know all of the potential problems and threats I might encounter (these are my “risks” and they include all the manmade and natural problems, both deliberate and inadvertent that pose a threat to my business).

· If I’ve identified all my potential problems and threats, I need to know how likely it is that each of those problems and threats might occur (all of the bad things that can potentially happen at my business do not all have the same potential for happening – an assault is more likely than a tornado, employee theft is more likely than an armed robbery, etc. – so we need to figure out what is most likely to occur so that we can determine which security measures will be most appropriate).

· If I’ve determined the likelihood of occurrence of each of my potential problems and threats, I need to know what the impact would be to my business, stuff and liability if any of those potential problems or threats occurred (even if/when something bad occurs the impact on business will be different – the loss from an employee caught stealing on his first day of work has less impact on the bottom line than the loss from an employee who has been stealing for the past 3 years, an attempted robbery in which an innocent bystander is seriously injured has greater impact on a business’s reputation than a loud disagreement about incorrect change – so we need to figure out which of the bad things most likely to occur will have the greatest negative impact if/when they do occur so that we can determine how best to allocate the limited resources for security measures) .

· If I need to develop a plan to protect my business and stuff from liability, I need to know if any adequate safeguards are currently in place (we need to determine if existing security measures are adequate to protect all identified assets and meet all identified risks, and to determine what additional security measures might need to be implemented).

So there you have it – we’ve come full circle: We know how to implement appropriate security strategies that will protect our businesses and do so in a manner that is legally defensible (by determining foreseeability via a security assessment); and we now know how to determine why we need a security program (as identified via a risk analysis).

Private Security / Law Enforcement Partnerships

There are probably a few readers who are wondering why this issue is even being discussed, since there are still a few security practitioners who do not (or cannot) see the importance and value of developing good working relationships and partnerships with our law enforcement counterparts. While it may not be the most current trendy management philosophy, I can state categorically after more than 30 years in private security that having good relationships with public law enforcement is not only desirable, but it is absolutely necessary to the success of a security or loss prevention program. Without belaboring the issue, let me illustrate just a few salient points:

· There will undoubtedly come a time when some type of criminal act occurs at the organization for which you have security responsibility; and there will undoubtedly be a time when that criminal act requires, for whatever reason, some form of law enforcement involvement. That type of incident should not be the first time that you have had communication with the appropriate law enforcement agency. Knowing each other beforehand will go a long way towards a satisfactory, timely and successful resolution to your problem. (And this relationship will prove even more important if the problem becomes complicated or difficult.)

· There will undoubtedly come a time when some form of emergency situation occurs at the organization for which you have security responsibility (a fire; a bomb threat; a power outage; a lost child; a domestic dispute involving an employee; etc. etc. etc.). Knowing who to contact and what to expect from the appropriate law enforcement agency will prove essential to successful problem resolution.

· There will undoubtedly come a time when a company investigation in which you are involved requires more information or resources than you have internally. Having a good working relationship with the appropriate law enforcement agency will provide at the very least a sounding board for discussing your situation and getting an informed second opinion; and may even provide the information and/or resources that you are lacking to continue or complete your investigation.

These are only a few obvious examples of the practical need for sound working relationships between the private security sector and public law enforcement. But the benefits of such relationships go beyond the boundaries of an individual security practitioner’s needs for his own organization. As far back as the 1970’s, there has been a realization that public law enforcement cannot do its job alone: increases in criminal activity and public outcry against continually-rising taxes has created a situation in which public law enforcement is spread dangerously thin. It is unrealistic and unreasonable to expect that law enforcement can immediately respond to every citizen’s – or every business’s – wants and needs. So, along with the increased necessity for a business organization to be more self-reliant with regard to its own security needs, so, too, does that necessitate a sound partnership with involved law enforcement agencies so that both sides know what to expect from the other, to insure proper strategic and operational planning. And this concept was dramatized and heightened even more after the tragic events of 9/11.

And then there is the altruistic reason. We in the security and LP industries frequently don’t give ourselves enough credit for the importance of our role (perhaps because we are all too often held in relatively low esteem by our employers – but that is another topic for discussion). Maybe it’s time to view ourselves from a different perspective. Since business and industry is the backbone of the American economy and culture, doesn’t it seem crucial for business and industry to be protected? Isn’t the protection of our business places (corporate citizens) as important as the protection of our individual citizens? So...from this viewpoint, maybe our role is a little more important than we have heretofore realized or given ourselves credit for. Perhaps there is not significant importance individually, but certainly collectively. And our role is becoming ever more important because of the myriad of threats that the American businessplace is experiencing in today’s social and economic reality – the stability of the American economy is unquestionably a target; and the economy goes as its individual components (i.e., our organizations) go. Whether we admit to it or not, and whether we like it or not, we are part of the overall criminal justice system. And, as such, we play a vital part in the protection of our society via the protection of our companies; and we must learn to work with other protective agencies to assure that we can successfully do our jobs.

I hope I have at least provided some sound arguments for the need for good working relationships and partnerships with public law enforcement.

Security Standards and the Question of Liability

There has recently been much rhetoric over the issue of security standards. Organizations such as UL (Underwriters Laboratories), NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) and ASIS International have undertaken projects to develop standards. And the process and even advisability of developing standards have both supporters and detractors. But with all the discussion and debate that has taken place, little has been said – at least publicly – about the issue that will have significant impact on the implementation of security standards: liability.

The reason that liability will be such a significant factor is because liability in and of itself is a controversial topic. While in theory there could probably be almost universal consensus that liability exposure should be avoided at all cost, the reality is that since virtually nothing can be done to guarantee the elimination of all liability (at least not until we cease to be such a litigious society), there has to be a recognition of the difference between trying to eliminate all risk and liability, and accepting or at least managing reasonable risk and liability.

As a quick reminder of Liability 101, “getting sued” is not the same as “being liable.” In fact, “getting sued” is not even the same as “getting sued successfully.” But those concerned about total liability avoidance in the business world – the bean counters and corporate attorneys – frequently take the path of least resistance and make an error when they equate avoiding lawsuits with avoiding liability. And the addition of security standards will be another factor in muddying the liability waters.

Security is not an exact science, and thus is not readily adaptable to the “cookie-cutter” or “one-size-fits-all” mold. And that is why developing security standards will be a formidable task, especially as related to the issue of liability. Once the factor of liability is brought into the security standards equation, the forensic interpretation of adequacy and sufficiency of security as determined by the Courts must be considered. And it will be in this legal arena that the full impact and importance of security standards will ultimately be determined.

From a practical perspective, the implementation of any security standards that may be developed will have mixed results. While some may see such standards as a “no-brainer” way to implement a security program, others will be more cautious. And both will be correct in their own limited ways: If developed properly, a set of standards will be a guide for building a basic security program; but since adequacy and sufficiency of any given security program is related to reasonableness vis-à-vis the risks at a given place, standards may not be appropriate in certain situations.

Moving forward to Security Liability 101, Courts across the country have long and consistently held that security measures must be commensurate with reasonably foreseeable threats and risks at a given place – the operative words being “foreseeable” and “given place.” This means that security programs will necessarily be different at different places (perhaps even at different places within the same organization) because the threats and risks might be different. So trying to find a set of standards that will be applicable to the myriad of potential scenarios will be difficult (at best) if not impossible to achieve.

The main value that I see to security standards is a compilation of strategies and best practices from which any organization can choose those which best suit its particular needs. And again, since security is not an exact science and there are almost always multiple ways to solve any given problem, such a compilation will allow any organization to pick and choose from a variety of strategies from which a sound security plan can be developed. This will meet the needs of organizations looking to maximize their security posture while also providing a framework for liability avoidance.

The Real Essence of Trials

The variety and disparity of feelings and opinions on the Casey Anthony verdict offers a timely opportunity to review the real purpose and conduct of trials.

As I state in the lectures on courtroom testimony and demeanor that I present to security officers,  a courtroom is not necessarily or unequivocally a place where justice is served; rather, it is a stage where situations and words are manipulated and where attorneys use the tools of credibility and persuasion to attain a desired result (hopefully with justice as a product).  A trial is basically and primarily a process of credibility vs. non-credibility – the side that is most believable usually wins, because every word uttered in court is subject to interpretation, analysis and impeachment.  A somewhat cynical description, but accurate.

As has been demonstrated in mock trials and moot courts, cases tried with the same basic sets of facts and evidence but presented by different litigators using different strategies and techniques can produce completely opposite verdicts.  And in the real world, we all know that the “quality” and/or intensity of prosecution and/or defense representation can have a profound effect on trials.

The moral:  While the facts of a case are undoubtedly important, the manner and style of case strategy and presentation is also of great importance.  This is a crucial concept to remember for security professionals who become involved and/or testify in legal matters as case principals, consultants and/or experts.

Living In “Relaxed Alertness”

Prevention of inappropriate acts, both criminal and terroristic, surely depends on good intelligence which includes (in overly simplistic terms): identifying the bad guys, learning about their plans, stopping the bad guys. But let’s not forget that bad acts are also thwarted by the hardening of potential targets.

We have heard the term “soft targets” used quite a bit lately. “Soft targets” generally refers to those places which traditionally attract little evil intent and which consequently do not prepare very well security-wise for the worst-case scenario. (Examples of soft targets include churches, shopping malls, hospitals, daycare centers, sports/entertainment venues, ground transportation systems and the like – places which attract large numbers of persons who are not immediately or primarily focused on security issues.) So “soft targets” become attractive to the bad guys because of the potential for a high-yield event with relatively little effort.

I certainly do not advocate making our society even more of an armed fortress than it currently is – the terrorists have already accomplished part of their goal by disrupting and changing our everyday way of life. But on the other hand, we have to stop being a reactive culture – we have to realize that bad people do bad things, and that we have some personal/corporate responsibility to do what we can to prevent and mitigate those bad people and things. All individuals and businesses should do some self-assessment of their particular security needs: determine what is important (their “assets”); determine what bad things can reasonably be anticipated to happen to those important things; and initiate an appropriate and commensurate security strategy. In other words, everybody should pretty much always be in a state of “relaxed alertness,” aware of surroundings, understanding that something bad could possibly happen, understanding that reasonable efforts have been taken to avoid those bad things, and being prepared to deal with the bad things if our proactive measures have not been totally adequate. This is not paranoia, it is simply being conscious of what could happen and being reasonably prepared for it.

(In fact, isn’t this a realistic and pretty good way to look at life in general??)

“Old School” vs. “New School” Security

There is definitely a distinct difference between “old school” and “new school” security philosophy.

While I understand and (sometimes) even appreciate and (sometimes) even utilize facets of “new school” thinking, I am basically an “old school” kind of security professional – maybe even a dinosaur. But my “old school” philosophy has been honed from over 40 years in this profession, in a great variety of activities and circumstances and situations. And my “old school” philosophy has resulted in significant successes at the 3 organizations for which I was Director of Security: no significant losses, no significant incidents, no significant problem trends, and NO successful lawsuits against my organizations. (In fact, the losses and incidents and trends and lawsuits increased substantially at those 3 organizations after I left them and was replaced by “new school” devotees.)

While there are many major differences between “old school” and “new school” security philosophy, here is what I see as perhaps the most significant: I have always spent more time planning security strategies than researching the metrics (see – “metrics” – a “new school” term). After I had built credibility in my organizations with those who counted – senior executive management, corporate attorneys and bean-counters – I was able to convince them of the efficacy of my strategies/programs without the need for the pretty charts and the myriad of footnotes and references and the 6 numbers after the decimal point. I had been there and done that and gotten the T-shirts so successfully that my word was sufficient. And then you can’t much argue with success. So I basically used my personal experience and knowledge, added a little intelligence-gathering (kept abreast of the news and the trade publications and watched and listened and observed), and then spent the majority of my time developing and refining my already-successful strategies and actually doing the things that protected my organizations.

Yes, it was a different time. Managers were selected for their abilities and were actually allowed to manage. As an experienced and credentialed security professional, I was expected to provide quality security services, and I didn’t have to reinvent the wheel every time I wanted to do something because it was presumed – in fact demanded – that that was my function as the responsible executive. Today is different, and today’s security executives rarely have the authority and responsibility (which just may equate to credibility?) to do the things that really should be done to adequately protect their organizations.

Yes, there is a big difference between vulnerabilities and threats. But until I have been convinced otherwise, every vulnerability is at least a potential threat that I have to assess and prioritize and act on. With the vast majority of my business now being involved in litigation as a Court-recognized expert witness, I continually observe organizations whose security programs are of the “it-can’t-happen-to-me” or “it-didn’t-happen-to-me-yesterday-so-it-won’t-happen-to-me-tomorrow” schools of thought; and those organization almost always lose more in the lawsuits which transpire after it does happen to them and they didn’t plan accordingly than if they had been proactive. In security, the adage of “an ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure” is almost always spot-on.

I guess the reason that I will remain “old school” is because after 40 years I have the metrics to prove that my “old school” way works, while “new school” advocates can only watch and wait and hope that their way is equally as effective – I hope it is, but I do have my doubts.

What Is An "Expert?"

When a technical or specialized issue (like medicine, or ballistics, or security) is raised through a legal proceeding (criminal trial, civil lawsuit/tort, etc.), attorneys for either or both sides will frequently retain/hire an "expert witness" to provide detailed, in-depth information about that technical/specialized issue and/or to render an "expert opinion" with regard to the technical/specialized issue as it relates to a particular case at hand.

There is no magic “standard” by which one is considered an expert. Attorneys generally try to select an individual with extensive experience in the technical/specialized field and who has some “reputation” for his knowledge and experience – in other words, someone who is generally regarded as a “go-to guy” in his field. Then, after being selected by an attorney, appointed as the “expert” for the case, and formally rendering an “expert opinion” in the case, the expert is scrutinized by opposing counsel who usually tries to question and refute the expert’s qualifications. Opposing counsel tries to present evidence to discredit the expert’s qualifications and/or credibility (I have actually been in depositions in which my background qualifications have been questioned for more than 4 hours – and no, I have never been disqualified as an expert). And if and/or when a case finally appears before a Judge, the expert may be formally recognized by the Court as an “expert”. This means that a Court has formally accepted the credentials of the expert and formally acknowledged his status as an “expert in his field.”

The opinions rendered by an expert during a legal proceeding may be presented/used in several ways: They may be used solely as advice/consultation by an attorney to help understand the issue and prepare his case; they may be used as the basis for a written "opinion report" which becomes part of the formal legal proceedings and case record; and/or they may be used as the basis for the expert’s testimony at deposition and/or trial. When an expert formally renders an opinion (via written report or testimony), that opinion is routinely scrutinized by the opposing side in the case; and opposing counsel may very well retain his own expert to review or refute.

Now comes the tricky part, and the part where the issue of “standards” comes into play. When an expert renders his opinion, he is really being asked to opine based on what in his own knowledge and experience is the most appropriate way of handling a particular situation under a given set of circumstances; and then to be able to convince the trier of fact (Judge or jury) that his way is better than the way being promulgated by the opposing side.

Let me digress for a moment to make a statement that I make immediately at the start of the class I teach on courtroom demeanor and testimony: Contrary to popular opinion, a trial is NOT a proceeding in which truth and justice are determined (although that may happen, albeit accidentally); a trial IS a proceeding in which one side’s opinion and testimony is more convincing than the other side’s, to one particular trier of fact, at one particular moment in time. The “winner” is not always truth and righteousness, and the “loser” is not always guilty. PERIOD. THE END.

So back to the issue of “experts.” For the sake of example, let’s say that the issue at hand is the appropriateness of actions taken by a security officer during an apprehension. The attorney for the “victim” (the plaintiff, the person who is complaining about the way that the apprehension was made) will probably have an expert who will testify that the procedure was totally wrong for a variety of reasons (issues like the officer’s actions in relation to training, policies, industry practices, exigent circumstances, and the like). And the attorney for the security officer and his company (the defendant) will probably have an expert who will testify that the actions were entirely appropriate and proper for a variety of reasons (issues like the officer’s actions in relation to training, policies, industry practices, exigent circumstances, and the like). SEE THE CONUNDRUM??????? Because there are no universal “standards” – an across-the-board, common way of doing things – who is to say who is right or who is wrong?? Sure, there are occasionally examples of actions so egregious that they are clearly wrong. But by and large, because there are no standards, it will boil down to whose expert and testimony was most credible and compelling. And this is why almost any attorney can almost always find an “expert” who will find some way to defend almost any action or position.

So…almost anyone in a given field can hold themselves out as an “expert” in that field. But being regarded as an expert in a court of law is a painstaking process that subjects the expert to widespread scrutiny of his qualifications, credentials and prior opinions. Most successful experts do little actual marketing, because their services are usually sought via word of mouth by attorneys or via reputation gained in similar and/or important cases.

I hope this sheds a little light…..

The Conundrum of Security

Here is a question for the ages: Why is it that – by and large – security has not been as widely accepted and embraced into corporate culture as virtually every other business operation discipline?


If this question could be answered, businesses would be much more secure, their assets would be better protected, and profits would necessarily grow commensurately. But we as individual practitioners and as an industry have failed to convince the C-Suite of this fundamental reality. Why??

While usually not analyzed as I will try to do, there is really very little difference between the security function and other operational disciplines. Consider:

· Security is generally considered a pure cost center. But isn’t protecting and retaining assets and profit (i.e., avoiding loss and liability) just as important to the bottom line as growing assets and profit?

· If money is spent ($ cost) to protect an asset and the asset is preserved, the full value of the asset is realized ($ retained + $ profit gained).

· If no money is spent ($ savings) to protect an asset and the asset is lost ($ value loss + $ profit loss) the asset needs to be replaced ($ cost), and then security will probably be added ($ cost) to protect the asset so it is not lost again.

So doesn’t providing proactive security actually save money in the long run and allow the setting by which profit can be gained?


Security is generally considered (at best) a “necessary evil” because it serves to protect against problems that may never occur. But isn’t that also a function of many other operational components that are considered integral to business functioning:

· Doesn’t Environmental Services clean spills so that someone doesn’t slip and fall (which may never happen even if the floor remains wet)?

· Doesn’t Maintenance make sure that machines keep on running properly so that production isn’t halted (which may never happen even if the machine isn’t maintained)?

· Doesn’t marketing develop ad campaigns so that products or services sell (even though products or services may sell even if the ads weren’t run)?

· Doesn’t Human Resources develop policies for issues like workplace violence and sexual harassment (even though workplace violence and sexual harassment may never occur)?

· Doesn’t Accounting have an outside auditor come in periodically to check the books (even though no mistakes or irregularities may be found)?

So why is security, which provides a secure environment so the business of the business can be conducted properly, not considered as important as those other functions? When – or if – this question is answered, the business world will be a better and safer place.

Developing an Emergency Plan

There is unfortunately no magic template that will help an organization develop an emergency plan because there are so many variables such as size and location of business, nature of business, types of employees and invitees, internal resources available, external resources available, etc. etc. etc.


That being said, here are a few thoughts that might be helpful:

· There is no such thing as AN emergency plan. Different plans must be developed to address a variety of potential emergencies (this should be obvious but is not always – for example, a weather-related emergency is totally different from an active shooter scenario).

· A team approach to plan development is good, bringing to the table not only the persons/functions responsible for crisis management but other representative stakeholders as well (both internal and external).

· Good emergency planning deals with issues related to emergency prevention/mitigation, response during the emergency, and aftermath response to include business continuity planning.

· A good emergency plan is as complex as needed yet as simple as possible.

· Having someone knowledgeable in emergency plan development is of paramount importance, to help the team focus on not only the major issues to be considered but the subtle nuances as well. This key resource person might be internal or external, might be an independent security consultant, or might be a local law enforcement or fire service representative. Public safety agencies need to be involved in planning and testing, but keep in mind that public safety agencies may not have the expertise and/or resources to serve as the key plan development resource (this is especially true in public safety agencies in smaller communities).

· Emergency plans, once formulated, need to be formalized via company policies, with appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.

· Emergency plans need to be tested on a regularly recurring basis, with both tabletop and practical drills, to include all entities that will be involved during an actual emergency. Things that look good on paper do not always translate equally to application. The purpose and ultimate value of drills is to not only look for the things that are right with the plan, but to actively seek out the things that are deficient so they can be modified/remedied.

· Emergency plans need to be reviewed on a regularly recurring basis. As organizations change (facilities, assets, resources, etc.), plans need to be modified accordingly.


Emergencies can and do occur – that is a basic fact of life. How well an organization copes with those emergencies is a function of sound planning and preparation.

The Security Return on Investment

If looked at solely from the perspective of immediate dollars-and-cents ROI, most security programs would be quickly eliminated, because they are almost always a “cost” center as opposed to a “profit” center – that is, they seldom generate enough revenue to at least pay for themselves. But this is a very narrow viewpoint that does not take into account the value of asset retention.

Since the primary foundation of a security program is to prevent or at least mitigate threats to assets, a successful program will be very difficult to “see.” It is hard to quantify that which does not occur. But the retention of assets (in other words, keeping the assets safely within the organization) is a concept that can be quantified and valued, at least in a general sense.

As a general rule, the failure to implement a sound security program until after a significant loss has occurred will be at least 3 times as expensive as implementing a security program from the outset: there will be the costs associated with the compromise/loss of the asset; there will the costs associated with the replacement of the asset that was lost; and there will be the costs associated with then implementing the protective measures that could have prevented the loss in the first place.

The investment in a sound security program can be likened to the investment in a good insurance policy: premiums continue to be paid for coverage that may never be needed; but coverage that is found to be truly indispensable and cost-effective when it is needed.