I feel as bad and outraged about the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas school in Parkland, Florida as anyone – I truly do. And I understand the frustration of the students and parents and staff at this school and others across the country who want something – anything – done to prevent such incidents in the future. I have listened to and read the heated comments about this incident, the calls for banning guns and more “gun control” (whatever that means). But I am outraged as much about what I haven’t heard or read.
Because of what I do for a living, I have dissected and analyzed this incident (and most of the others like it) both frontwards and backwards. And what I rarely see (the shooting from Mandalay Bay Resort in Las Vegas being a notable exception) is any outrage directed toward the place where the shooting occurred…in other words, the lack of security which allowed such an event to happen.
Consider just these few issues related to Stoneman Douglas school:
· There was nothing or no one to identify, prevent, restrict or impede the armed shooter from being on the school grounds – no outdoor access control.
· There was nothing or no one to monitor, identify, screen, prevent, restrict or impede the armed shooter from getting into the school – no perimeter access control.
· There was nothing or no one to monitor, screen, prevent, restrict, impede or limit the armed shooter from roaming through the school once he got in – no interior access control or response plan.
· There was the questionable response from the school resource officer who failed to immediately enter the school to engage the shooter.
But of course the measures needed to remedy these shortcomings – which are unfortunately common at most schools across the country – require more resources, and nobody wants their taxes raised or additional fees imposed.
The point I am trying to make is that there is no single or simple fix to prevent these types of incidents. We need to expend resources to reasonably harden our schools and other “soft targets.” We need to assure that we have adequate plans in place to respond to these kinds of incidents because there is no such thing as perfect or absolute security and such situations will surely be attempted in the future. And perhaps most importantly we need to expend resources to identify and deal with the kinds of aberrant people and behaviors which commit these heinous acts.
What we don’t have to do is focus all the blame and attention on banning guns and creating more gun laws, because to do so ignores the real roots of the problem.
Monday, April 09, 2018
Wednesday, November 22, 2017
Security In Today’s World
We claim to be winning the war on terrorism; and we base
this claim on the fact that there have been relatively few significant
terrorist acts in the recent past.
(This does of course make a distinction between extremist/radical
terrorism and homegrown domestic violence/terrorism – although the lines are
becoming more and more blurred.)
But our sense of accomplishment and almost-victory is belied
by reality. The bad guys – whatever
their ilk – are in fact winning. To
make my point, consider the following:
·
Heavily armed law enforcement officials patrol downtown
areas and sporting venues and public buildings and transportation hubs and
election sites. The Super Bowl is
classified as a National Security Event.
·
The airplane experience has no resemblance to what it
used to be: removing shoes, physical
body searches, extensive baggage screening, waiting lines to enter plane areas
and board are now the norm.
·
The places we went to feel safe and to “get away from
it all” – the movie theatres and restaurants and resorts and public parks and
shopping malls are now the scenes of cruel and deadly attacks and murders. We now go armed to those places.
·
The places we went for comfort and solace and healing
and education – schools, churches, hospitals, day care centers, rehab
facilities – are now places where the bad guys know they can prey upon the
defenseless.
So with all these changes to the way we feel and the way we
must now live, can we really say that we are “winning” the war on terrorism?
I think there is some comfort and consolation in knowing
that bad events are still relatively infrequent. But I also think that we must never let our sense of comfort
overshadow our sense of realization that we still live in an unpredictable and
not-so-safe world.
Tuesday, January 03, 2017
Being An “Expert”
In the security profession
– or in any discipline really – being an “expert” or “expert witness” is
usually not a position to which one aspires at an early age. It often comes first as an ancillary
endeavor, then perhaps as a full-time profession. It usually comes mid-career, and often endures past career prime
and even past normal retirement time.
So how does one “become” an expert?
Is there a course or test that must be taken to “become” an expert? Here’s the reality:
One does not necessarily seek
recognition as an “expert;” and “expert” is not a connotation or designation
bestowed on oneself – it is status or standing in one’s profession as attested
to and recognized and conferred by others.
Therefore, there is – and really can be – no course of study or training
program or test that culminates with the title of “expert” since a true
“expert” does not become so until the expertise is recognized by others.
An “expert” is generally recognized for a composite of
professional education, training, experience, expertise, analytical skills,
writing skills, presentation skills, involvement in professional organizations,
involvement in professional activities as a volunteer, professional and
personal integrity, professional and personal credibility – and having a good
track record in all the aforementioned.
And in addition to these attributes, “experts” usually have some other
traits that are acknowledged by others:
He is the “go-to” guy within his organization; he is a “go-to” guy within one’s industry and/or among one’s
professional peers; he is actively
sought to help with resolving problems or improving operations or developing
strategies or developing policies and procedures – being sought to do for
others what they should/could be doing for themselves. He is regarded as the person who will almost
undoubtedly do the right thing or have the right answer at the right time.
So being the smartest man in the world by self-appointment –
even if true – does not make one an “expert” as the term is being used
here. Rather, it is the acknowledgement
by others that one is the right person to do a particular job that
distinguishes one as an “expert.”
Wednesday, June 29, 2016
Words To Live – Or Stay Living – By
In the world of security, as in many facets of life, an old adage is absolutely true: It is better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.
Thursday, January 28, 2016
The Concept Of “Reasonable Security”
Every organization has a legal obligation to provide a safe environment, based on the concept of “reasonable security.” The owner/landlord does not have to guarantee absolute security. However, reasonableness and adequacy of security must be affirmatively demonstrated. This basic concept is founded in most states’ case law (and, in some states, in statutory law). In today’s world, there is virtually no place that can claim that no security is adequate.
The implementation or existence of a
security program in and of itself does not guarantee that the program is
adequate and sufficient, since the standard by which a security program will be
judged is reasonableness with regard to foreseeable threats and risks at a specific
place.
“Reasonable security” has been consistently defined by
premises security case law to mean that appropriate security measures must be
implemented commensurate with risks which are reasonably foreseeable at a
specific place. And a reasonable consideration
of foreseeability has been determined to include the nature of the premises;
the history of incidents at the premises; the history of incidents in
geographic surroundings; and any
relevant industry standards.
Adequacy of security is legally
defensible only when vulnerabilities
and risks are assessed via some conscious or formalized process to determine
foreseeability, and commensurate security measures then implemented to reasonably address those
identified foreseeable risks (this is the usual standard by which adequacy and
sufficiency of security is determined by courts).
A good process for developing a sound security strategy has dual benefits: The program will be designed to protect the organization’s assets; and the program will be legally defensible should it be challenged in court.
Friday, June 12, 2015
SOMETIMES...
SOMETIMES...
good security means doing things that are not politically correct – you can’t always have it both ways;
doing the right thing is more important than following the rules or being politically correct;
the perception of good security is as good as or better than the reality;
there isn’t a good choice – sometimes you must choose between the best of the bad choices;
the end does justify the means;
it’s better to be judged by 12 than carried by 6;
popularity of an issue does not equate to fairness or justice;
a verdict has nothing to do with a good or bad prosecution strategy or a good or bad defense strategy –sometimes a verdict is based simply on facts and evidence;
“justice” fueled by public opinion and media and political pressure is not really justice;
“justice” is not what someone wants it to be – sometimes justice is simply what is;
the cutest puppy has the meanest growl and the sharpest teeth;
you get what you want, but sometimes you get what you deserve.
there is virtually nothing that is purely or simply black or
white.
Labels:
reasonable security,
security,
security expert
Wednesday, February 11, 2015
Value In “Dummy” Surveillance Cameras?
As both a former Director of Security and now an independent
security consultant, I have rarely been a proponent of using “dummy” cameras as
part of a security strategy.
Real cameras are used for several general purposes: To monitor areas/events in real time to
(hopefully) initiate appropriate response as needed; and/or to record
areas/events for investigative/documentation purposes; and/or to provide a
visible deterrent to inappropriate activities;
and/or to provide a heightened sense of security to the area’s
legitimate users.
With that being the case for real cameras, here are the
operational downsides of using “dummy” cameras: Obviously, there is no real-time monitoring of areas/events
possible, so appropriate response to problems is not possible (and it would be
cost-prohibitive – and economically foolish – to try to replace cameras with
personnel); and obviously, there is no recording of events for
investigative/documentation purposes (the chances of personnel being able to
provide comparable information are slim).
On the plus side, there might be a comparable visible deterrent to
inappropriate activity, especially if the cost savings of “dummy” cameras vs.
real cameras is used to provide additional “dummies.” But even that deterrent value might be negated if poor-quality
“dummy” cameras (an oxymoron?) are used which are easily identified as
“dummies” because of no lights or wiring connections. (NOTE: the only time I
have ever used “dummy” cameras was to add the impression of even more cameras
to an application of real cameras which already covered everything I wanted
covered.
But to me, the primary problem with the use of “dummy”
cameras is an unnecessary and thus unacceptable increase in liability.
The heightened sense of security for legitimate area users is totally
negated when it is learned that there is no real protection being afforded.
Legitimate users will feel betrayed and tricked when the truth is learned (and
it will be – someone will find out somehow). And the worse-case scenario will
be when an incident occurs and a victim questions and learns why there was no
ready response or at least visual documentation of the event. I have been involved in such cases as an
expert witness (this would most probably evolve as a premises security
liability lawsuit based on inadequate security) and have been able to opine
that the “dummy” cameras created a false sense of security that did not truly
exist, and this is actually worse than having no cameras of any kind: at least if there are no cameras present,
legitimate users will not have any expectations as to the level of security and
may thus be more aware of their own responsibility for personal security; where
on the contrary a legitimate user may be less aware of personal security issues
since he believes that he is being “helped” by real cameras.
Bottom line for me:
“Dummy” cameras have the potential to cause more problems than they
solve.
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