Academic vs. Practical Security Knowledge

Regardless of the extent of knowledge acquired via formal education or academic pursuit, it is almost always most beneficial to retain a security consultant or expert witness who has practical, hands-on experience in the subject matter at hand.

When a particular situation or case needs someone to interpret or present information that is based solely on scientific or theoretical fact, an expert with only an educational or academic background might be most suitable.  But in circumstances requiring expert OPINION – knowledge of specialized information and its application to a specific scenario – an expert with practical experience is most valuable.  In such cases, an expert who has been personally involved in the application of the relevant subject matter to a variety of diverse situations will be best able to provide the comprehensive insight that is needed to best assist the organization or attorney because he has had to not only know the subject matter, but has had to apply that knowledge to the situational nuances of the real world (a skill not generally found in experts who only possess academic or theoretical knowledge).

The primary value that a security consultant or expert witness brings to an organizational situation or legal case is his ability to apply general security principles to a specific situation because he has been there and done that.

Business Size And The Need For Security

Regardless of the size and sophistication of a business – from the sole proprietor of the neighborhood bar to the international conglomerate – the concept of providing a reasonably safe premises remains the same:   namely, a business must provide reasonable security commensurate with reasonably foreseeable threats and risks; and reasonable foreseeability is generally determined by a conscious analysis of the inherent nature of the business and the history of general criminal acts at and around the business.

 

While large organizations may meet their obligation to provide a safe environment via sophisticated security programs with designated personnel and formalized policies and procedures, even small businesses must do something proactively to meet their obligation – they must still take into account the kinds of problems that they will likely encounter given their particular situation (i.e., location, nature of business, clientele, prior problems, etc.).

 

Many small businesses erroneously presume that their small size will somehow either preclude problems or somehow absolve them of their legal obligation to provide a safe environment.  But statistics continue to show that small businesses – bars, apartment buildings, retail stores, etc. – are the venues where criminal activities are most likely to occur and consequently the kinds of places most likely to be sued for inadequate security.  And the settlements and awards stemming from these lawsuits should give business owners and operators cause for concern.

 

This information is important for 2 reasons:  First, it is prudent for businesses to understand that proactive attention to security matters is better and ultimately less expensive than after-the-fact litigation; and businesses that may find themselves involved in premises security liability cases need to remember that the criteria by which security is assessed will be the same regardless of the size of the business at which an incident has occurred.

The Paradox of “Soft Targets”

There is both an irony and conundrum related to active shooter scenarios at soft targets: These types of places – and by the way, “soft targets” refers not only to places that customarily have minimal or at least non-aggressive security programs but also to places where the site’s users customarily have some sense of it being a safe place (so even personal security awareness is low) – almost “create” their desirability as targets because they consciously choose (or, “make business decisions”) to maintain a low security posture. And while these “reasons” are sometimes economic, that is not always the full story: there still seems to be some prevalent thought among proprietors of soft targets that the appearance of aggressive security somehow conveys an impression of impending danger. And isn’t that ironic – some people actually believe that more security equates to or implies greater danger. (I may be wrong, but I never thought that banks were inherently dangerous because they have armed guards!?!

 

No one deserves to be a target for violence. But I tend to feel a bit less sorry for places at which violence occurs when it is learned that those place consciously chose to do little if anything to minimize or mitigate their vulnerability.

 

Can Security Programs Really Do More With Less

Can we almost always find ways to do a little more with a little less? Certainly, as we have all experienced.  But here’s the downside: The reality is that we really don’t do a “little more” – we may do a “little more” in quantity, but actually do a “little less” in quality. And every “little less” that we do results in decreased service and increased liability (the old and true “you can pay me now or pay me later” adage).

 

When we talk about “working smarter” or better utilizing technology, we usually mean the replacement of people with machines and systems.  Automation is not a significant part of this problem (smaller budgets for security), contrary to what many “new school” practitioners and security product vendors would have you believe. Surely automation can make security somewhat easier, but it doesn’t necessarily make it better, because people will always be part of the equation and people will always be a significant and costly and on-going budget line item.  Virtually all of the types of services routinely provided by security personnel – preventive patrol, evicting trespassers, opening doors, providing escorts, conducting investigations, problem intervention, etc. – could not be accomplished without people. Can technology help? Sure. But successful conclusions to security incidents and problems rarely can occur without security personnel.

 

Other business operations don’t have the same problems as Security: When sales are down, marketing and advertising costs go up; when customer service complaints rise, personnel hiring costs go up; when floors get too dirty and equipment breaks down, housekeeping and maintenance costs rise. But even when security is at stake and problems and/or liability increase, the budget for security gets cut.

 

The panacea is not all the latest technologies and bells and whistles or even more operational security personnel. What we need is better security executives who can credibly sell security service based on accurate data collection and analysis, and who have the fortitude to strongly support and defend their positions even when such may not be politically- or career-correct (or wise).

The Re-Branding of Security

There has been an effort over the past several years to change the titles of persons who perform security functions within an organization: I have seen such persons in various industries called “asset protection specialists,” “loss prevention associates,”  “protection officers,” “doormen,”  “ushers,”  even “ambassadors.”  But regardless of a company’s job title nomenclature, these persons all perform, to some degree,  the function of security:  namely, protecting the assets of that company.  And the function is more important than the title.

 

Perhaps companies believe that the word “security” has somehow taken on a negative connotation, that the presence of “security” somehow implies an admission that problems exist (the PR department’s nightmare).  But in reality – especially in our post-9-11 world – the very concept of “security” should be embraced as a comfort.  So maybe the root problem is that there is a misperception and misunderstanding of what “security” really is.

 

 

I think that most people’s primary exposure to and perception of what “security” is comes from the uniformed guards that they see wherever they go (it’s getting to be the Holiday Season, so perhaps the armed guards at the front door of Toys-R-Us will be back!).  And because the guards in uniform look like police officers in uniform – whose primary job (people think) is patrolling and responding to problems – they equate the two types of personnel to that similar job function.  But just as there is so much more to law enforcement work than the visible patrol officer, so too is there much more to “security” than observe and respond (which is amazingly ironic, since a good percentage of security personnel are only supposed to observe-and-report as opposed to observe-and-respond).  And to compound the confusion, since police officers are usually seen in the aftermath of a crime that has already been committed, that ascription of similar function makes people believe that “security = problems.”  But those in our profession know that the opposite is really the truth – that the foundation and raison d’etre of security is finding ways to identify and prevent (or at least mitigate) problems before they occur.  The underlying principle of security should be to create a safe, inviting environment for all the persons who visit a company and have dealings with it.

 

So for those companies that have tried to be politically correct by re-branding the persons who try to keep them safe and to try to convey the impression that problems do not exist, that is certainly your choice.  But I for one am comforted whenever I visit a place that proudly announces that it has good and strong “security.”

 

 

The Building Blocks Of Security

From the first tower of a toddler to the most sophisticated building in the world, no structure can be put together properly without a firm foundation of building blocks.  And if we equate the infrastructure of a business to a building and presume that part of that infrastructure is a sound security program to make sure that the business doesn’t collapse, the same holds true – we need a firm foundation of building blocks.

 

Here are the building blocks that will result in a sound security program:

·         If I need to protect my business and my stuff and my liability, I need to know exactly what my business and my stuff and my liability are.

·         If I need to protect my business and my stuff and my liability, I need to know all of the potential problems and threats I might encounter that might put them at risk.

·         If I’ve identified all my potential problems and threats, I need to know how likely it is that each of those problems and threats might occur so that I can prioritize them.

·         If I’ve determined the likelihood of occurrence of each of my potential problems and threats, I need to know what the impact would be to my business, stuff and liability if any of those potential problems or threats occurred so that I can prioritize them.

·         If I’ve gathered all the information about my business and stuff and liability and prioritized them,  and prioritized all the problems and threats that may occur, I need to determine if a security plan is needed. 

·         If I already have a plan to protect my business and stuff and liability, I need to know if any safeguards I currently have in place are adequate and sufficient.

·         If I don’t already have plan to protect my business and stuff and liability, I need to develop one based on the information I’ve gathered, and I need to implement the appropriate safeguards.

·         If I have a plan and safeguards to protect my business and stuff and liability, I have to assess and adjust them regularly to assure that they remain adequate and sufficient in relation to changing circumstances.

A firm foundation usually assures that what is on top of and around it is strong.

What Is “Profiling” – And Is It Inherently Bad

From the never-ending hunt for terrorists to the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin criminal case, the term “profiling” is much in everyday news and media.  But do we fully understand the concept?

 

If memory serves me correctly, “profiling” was initially intended to connote an unwarranted singling out of a particular group for excessive or intense scrutiny.  The term was primarily focused on law enforcement practices,  and was usually translated to mean the surveillance of persons of color by white police officers for no particular or specific reason other than the color of their skin.  The term was then expanded:  “surveillance” was expanded to include practices such as stopping, questioning, detaining, and harassing; and “color of their skin” was expanded to include certain names, ethnic groups, religious affiliations and neighborhoods.  Used in that narrow and straightforward context, “profiling” is not a good concept or effective law enforcement strategy. 

 

HOWEVER:  With the advent of sophisticated data collection practices and tools, information-gathering has become the norm rather than the exception, so the “simple” concept of profiling is no longer so simple and straightforward.  Now there are empirical ways to gather and analyze data to single out and categorize specific groups for specific reasons – the perpetrators of every type of crime or terrorist act can be specifically identified and correlated to specific kinds of incidents.  This categorization of individuals who are undeniably linked to particular kinds of crimes and incidents creates groups who need to be more intensely scrutinized than groups who have little if any relationship to those crimes. 

 

Hypothetical case in point:  I am the Security Manager for a store with a significant theft problem.  I have competently performed my due diligence and gathered and analyzed information from 5 years worth of theft statistics including surveillance video and apprehensions and investigations and interviews, and the resulting empirical data shows that 95% of my theft problems have been caused by well-dressed white women over the age of 50.  Is it not then good practice to pay special surveillance attention to well-dressed white women over the age of 50 who come into my store?  And if so, then watching for those women is NOT “profiling” in the bad sense, it is good, reasonable and appropriate security practice which I would be remiss to ignore.  But have I singled out (“profiled”) a particular group for enhanced observation?  Certainly. 

 

Profiling is not inherently a bad practice.  It is bad only when used in a haphazard, uneducated, unsubstantiated manner.  So the intensified scrutiny of young Middle Eastern men by those concerned with terrorism detection and prevention, or the focused scrutiny of an unrecognized young black man by a neighborhood watch volunteer are not intrinsically bad things.

Righting 4 Profeshunals

You can probably read and understand the title of this post, but that doesn’t make it right…

 

I currently belong to a number of online professional forum groups; and I’m active in the groups, so I see many posts from persons with lots of letters after their names including those denoting professional certifications and Masters Degrees and Doctorates.  Yet I continue to be amazed at the quality of communication from many persons who share their thoughts in these posts because,  with all due respect, the quality of the written words frequently is not commensurate with what I expect from professionals.  Spelling errors (which can largely be avoided with Spell Check), grammatical usage errors, use of incorrect words and terms (“then” for “than,” “there” for “their” or “they’re,” etc.), poor (if any) punctuation, etc. etc. seem to be the norm rather than the exception.

 

So why is this important, you ask?  This is only going to be seen by others on the forum, you say?  Maybe!!   But I have a hard time believing that the same people who cannot write a coherent sentence to fellow practitioners and professionals take the time and make the effort to do any better when they’re writing “official” documents, reports and memos.  And how do we know that the very people who we should be trying to impress – like bosses, clients, professional adversaries, etc. – aren’t also reading what we write?

 

Habits are difficult to break, especially when it comes to speaking and writing.  If someone is used to using colorful, vulgar language in everyday speech, sooner or later one of those colorful terms is going to slip out at exactly the wrong moment – like when having a conversation with a corporate executive or a client.  If someone is used to writing careless and sloppy postings on a forum (like texting “shorthand”), sooner or later that same level and quality of writing is going to be used in a document being read by a company president or local District Attorney or Judge.  Based on some of the posts on these forums, it’s sometimes difficult to get to and appreciate the content of a post because of all the distractions from poor format.  And yes, I realize that many professionals have someone else to do their formal writing. But professionals do – or should – proofread any work done on their behalf, which is hard to do if the professional himself is lax in writing skills (it’s hard to find errors when reading if you can’t write any better yourself).  And even those professionals with assistants to do most of their writing occasionally write for themselves (like in these forums) and the deficiencies become glaring.

 

And one other reason why this is important:  Professionals are frequently judged on first impressions, and first impressions are frequently made based on what we say or on something we’ve written.   If we communicate well, our actions may not be scrutinized as closely because we will be perceived as intelligent, knowledgeable people. But if we communicate poorly, our actions – even the good ones – can be diminished because of what we have said or written.  The quality of communication – either verbal or written – is just as important as the content.  And with the proliferation of online forums where everything everyone writes is preserved for posterity, it becomes a simple matter for anyone – like an opposing attorney – to dig up a file full of posted faux pas in an attempt  to disparage professionalism and credibility (an avoidable problem, thus inexcusable).

 

One of the best compliments I have ever received during my tenure as a Director of Security was being told by a District Attorney that the reports written by my security personnel were far superior to those written by the local police.  I have seen cases lost because of poor communication (documentation).  But in 30+ years, neither I nor my staff have ever lost a case for that reason.

 

Meant as constructive criticism, and to generate thought…

Conducting Emergency Preparedness Drills

There is increasing awareness and understanding of the need for adequate and proper planning for emergencies.  Preparedness for any type of emergency (natural or man-made, accidental or deliberate, criminal or terrorist) really requires not only the development of an appropriate strategy and plan with commensurate policies and procedures, but 2 additional, separate but equally important activities:  a desktop exercise, and a live/physical drill.

 

The desktop exercise will be of significantly longer duration than the live drill (because activities will be discussed consecutively rather than occurring concurrently) and should include all stakeholders, all of whom should participate in all aspects of the exercise.  The agenda should include verbalization and visualization (maps, charts, etc.) of all steps that would be taken during each phase of an actual emergency.  Key decision-makers and responders for each phase should take the lead in the discussions, but the discussions should also include immediate analysis, feedback and critique from all participants to assure that as many nuances and potential problems as possible are brought to light (the different perspectives from persons usually not directly involved in a particular aspect can be very helpful and insightful).

 

To be effective and a true learning and preparedness experience, a live/physical drill must include everyone that would normally be involved at the time of a live incident (and that includes random types of non-employees who would normally be present at the scheduled time of the drill) and should be conducted in real time – some organizations erroneously believe that only certain employees need to participate in an emergency drill and those only need to slowly act out or verbalize their motions during the drill.  But such is not productive, since it is important to learn/know what the scope of chaos and extent of time will be during an actual event, both of which are critical for successful mitigation of a real emergency.

 

As in any facet of real life, theoretical knowledge is important; but actual hands-on participation is a key component of assuring that emergency plans are truly workable.

What Is “Success” In Security?

There is one unequivocal certainty in the world of security:  There is no such thing as absolute security (defined as some strategy or system that will fully protect everything against everything all the time) – given sufficient resources, motivation and opportunity, any/every security strategy and system can eventually be breached.

 

So…since we know that even the best security may be breached, how do we measure success?

 

For purposes of this commentary, we have to re-define some terms that are usually pretty straightforward – “success” and “failure.”

 

Let’s begin with “failure.”  In the world of security, we can have occasional “failures” (independent, isolated incidents in which the security plan was not fully effective), without having “FAILURE” (a complete and continuing collapse of protection due to an ineffective security strategy). 

 

The same holds true for “success.”  We can have recurring “successes” (times during which protection efforts are adequate and sufficient to meet extant security needs), even while realizing that we can never achieve “SUCCESS” (the continuous state of everything being adequately and sufficiently protected against everything).

 

When trying to assess whether security has been a “success” or a “failure” based on these definitions, we must also add another component to the mix: "legal defensibility" (a security strategy that includes the elements that a reasonable person would utilize to provide reasonable security at a particular place and time under a given set of circumstances).  The addition of this concept raises another interesting conundrum:  Even when security efforts are occasionally “successful,” they may not be "legally defensible" (because the security strategy may not withstand legal scrutiny when an incident occurs).  

 

So back to the original question: What is success in security?   The answer is really not that difficult:  Success in security is the existence of a strategy which protects most things most of the time; and which will endure legal/forensic analysis during challenges which result from short-lived “failures.”

 

As always we should hope for the best, but we must plan for the worst.

Challenges To Effective Security

Here are some facts that I have found to be unequivocally true during my 30+ years of providing security service and counsel to a wide variety of organizations:

 

We ARE a reactive culture.  For a variety of reasons, primarily economic, we do not do the things proactively that would make us less attractive targets; and we naively believe that “it can’t happen to me.”

 

There ARE bad people in this world, bad for a variety of reasons, who do bad things; and many of those bad people are not recognized preemptively because we again naively believe in the inherent goodness of all people and tend to and want to overlook anything that deviates from that rosy perspective.

 

There is NO SUCH THING as absolute security – nothing can be done to assure that nothing bad ever happens.  The best that can be achieved is security that protects from most bad things most of the time – and even that level requires continuous attention.

 

People intent on doing bad things WILL find a way to achieve their objective – they WILL find the resources and opportunity to perpetrate bad things, regardless of what stumbling blocks – i.e., good security – are imposed.

 

Those are the downsides; here are the upsides:

 

Even being reactive is BETTER than ignoring security problems completely and continuously.

 

IF we stop always trying to be politically correct and IF we make informed, judicious, prudent use of tools like “profiling” we WILL be more able to proactively identify more bad people.  And after my lengthy experience in this business,  I totally despise the currently-in-vogue concept of “profiling” – if empirical data suggests that 95% of my problems are caused by xxx people, then watching for xxx people is NOT profiling, it is good, reasonable security practice which I would be remiss to ignore.

 

IF we harden targets appropriately, having adequate and sufficient security will not stop all bad things from happening, but it WILL stop most of the worst things most of the time.

 

Even bad persons usually hope to achieve 2 things: accomplishment of their bad deeds, and concluding the accomplishment of their bad deeds in the way they desire (usually either anonymous escape, or suicide). Good security WILL reduce the“environment conducive to criminality” at a given place so that the bad person might choose to do his bad things elsewhere.

 

A whole other facet of this issue may divert into a discussion of who is best able to provide security guidance and assistance to the places that most need it.  Once again – as usually is the case – economics dictates to many organizations that security planning assistance comes from a little- or no-cost resource, which is frequently the local law enforcement agency.  But with all due respect to my law enforcement colleagues who provide heroic and loyal service on a daily basis,   they are usually not the best source of advice on security matters, if for no other reason than that is not their primary job focus.

 

Better security can be achieved anywhere…but it comes at a cost and requires a commitment.

Sandy Hook Tragedy - Response, Part II

The tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School seems to have offended our sensibilities more than other such tragedies because of the ages of the victims.  But in reality, this tragedy was not significantly different or worse than other such events – innocent lives should never be lost at the hands of a crazed or deranged person.  The term “gun violence” is always a prominent part of stories about these events, and the anti-gunners capitalize on that fact to put their emphasis on the wrong word:  the crux of the problem is violence, not guns.

 

While not the warm and fuzzy, politically correct philosophical ideal, it is nonetheless an absolute fact that it is simply and literally impossible to identify all the people who will do bad things and/or to accurately predict what bad things they will do and/or when and where they will do them.  Period.

 

Since bad things will undoubtedly happen regardless of our wishes, intentions and preventive efforts (because there is no such thing as absolute security, meaning some system/strategy that will protect against any conceivable or possible threat at all times), it behooves us to have the best mitigation, response and recovery strategies in place to protect everything important (meaning people, physical things and information).

 

Security must be considered at least as important and necessary as our attitudes and endeavors related to fire, which we have embraced and incorporated wholeheartedly:  While it is nice to idealize that people and things won’t burn and hope that “…it can’t happen here,”  yet we still design and implement (and pay for) reasonable and sometimes mandated fire protection precautions into our buildings; and install fire control systems and have fire response equipment in our buildings; and have regular fire system inspections; and have extensive fire plans that are reviewed and updated regularly; and have regular fire drills; and have internal personnel properly trained to deal with fires; and have Fire Departments to come and put out fires when they occur; and have plans to maintain and/or resume operations after a fire event. Why is the same not so for security?

 

Why are places with adequate and sufficient fire control systems and procedures not considered “fire traps,” but places with adequate security systems and procedures are considered “armed fortresses?” When I walk into a building and see sprinklers on the ceiling and fire extinguishers at key places and evacuation route maps and “No Smoking” signs on the walls and a fire truck parked outside, I get a feeling of comfort – the thought never crosses my mind that this building must pose some grave fire danger.  Why do we not put commensurate emphasis on security?   Why do we not see alarm systems and CCTV cameras and monitors and uniformed – perhaps armed – security personnel as an indication of concern for our safety and security?

 

Logic and consistency do not seem to be traits held in esteem by anti-gun proponents, because in virtually no other situation do they condemn the tool used in a bad consequence as the cause or culprit:  When a porch pulls away and falls from a house killing/injuring partygoers, the hammer is not blamed.  When a pedestrian is killed by a drunk driver, the car is not blamed.  When an editorial or cartoon is written that enflames and angers the masses, the typewriter/computer is not blamed Only when it comes to guns is the tool rather than the actor condemned.

 

We learned (or should have learned) from Benghazi that diplomatic and bureaucratic and philosophic options are meaningless at the time of an attack, because without proper response capability good people die.  When my family is being threatened with grave harm and I am not present to intervene, I do not want a philosopher or psychologist or social worker or a book of social ills analysis there – I want “…rough men (who) stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.”

 

Sandy Hook Tragedy - Response, Part I

Once again a tragedy involving a firearm has struck the U.S. (Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut); and the aftermath brings the usual spate of comments and solutions to avert such tragedies in the future, most of which deal with additional regulation of guns.  But let’s not forget that most of the rhetoric related to guns and gun laws is spouted by both individuals and media who have little if any true knowledge or experience with either.  Cases in point:

 

Many/most of the current diatribes make frequent use of the terms “assault rifle” and “semi-automatic” and paint them with the same negative brush. In reality, an “assault rifle” (as available to civilians) is nothing more than a cosmetically-different rifle (configured to resemble a military weapon), most of which are “semi-automatic” which simply means that 1 bullet is fired with each pull of the trigger and the next bullet is fed into the firing chamber without manual manipulation (strictly speaking, even a revolver operates in a “semi-automatic” manner!).

 

There are literally tens of thousands of gun-related laws in the U.S., ranging from Federal law to local/municipal law. Virtually every facet of owning, carrying, transporting and using a gun is either directly regulated in some way or is covered under the umbrella of some related law (e.g., a general law relating to disorderly conduct would encompass the act of unnecessarily brandishing a gun).

 

Deliberate gun violence (crime) and inadvertent gun harm (accidents) are not the “epidemic” that might be expected due to the civilian ownership of approx. 300 million guns in the U.S. – approx. 8% of all violent crimes are committed by a person known to have a gun, and approx. .5% (1/2 of 1 percent) of all fatal accidents involve guns.

 

Guns are used approx. twice as often for self-defense as they are to commit crimes; and crime and murder rates are generally lower in states with established concealed-carry laws.

 

Two of the cities with the strictest regulation of gun ownership and possession in the U.S., Washington, D.C. and Chicago, IL, have crime and murder rates involving handguns significantly higher than the national average for the same offenses; and both cities had significant increases in their crime and murder rates after the more stringent gun laws went into effect.

 

There is no way to predict anti-social or psychopathic behavior (the root causes of the vast majority of gun misuse); and there is no way to assure that a person unfit to own, possess or use a gun will never do so.

 

So…guns are not inherently evil, they are simply tools for a variety of purposes; there are sufficient gun laws on the books if they would be administered/enforced strictly and consistently (the vast majority of gun-related crimes are diminished or pled down during criminal proceedings); the vast and overwhelming majority of guns in the U.S. are owned and used lawfully and responsibly.

 

Here is a rhetorical question for the anti-gunners: If guns are so inherently bad, why do you immediately want a gun on scene (in the hands of a trained professional) to respond to and mitigate some evil action?   It would seem that that in itself is a tacit admission that it is not the gun itself that is inherently bad…

The "Environment Conducive to Criminality"

In most states in the U.S., landlords/proprietors have some basic obligation to provide a reasonably safe and secure environment for tenants, patrons and other invitees.  This obligation may arise from specific laws/statutes, or from general laws/statutes relating to negligence, or from case law. 

 

In any event, the obligation to provide a safe environment virtually always uses the concept of reasonable security based on foreseeability as the test for adequacy and sufficiency of security when some incident occurs.  In simple terms, this means that a landlord/proprietor must take the precautions that a reasonable person would take under the same/similar conditions and circumstances after giving due consideration to factors affecting the premises (namely:  the inherent nature of the premises; the history of problems at the premises; the history of problems in the area immediately surrounding the premises; and any industry standards that may exist relating to the premises).  This definition thus presupposes that some “one-size-fits-all” approach to security will usually not be adequate or sufficient since circumstances are different at every premises.  But the single factor which exists in the majority of times when some security incident occurs at some specific place is what I refer to as the “environment conducive to criminality.”

 

Let me here make a disclaimer:  There is no such thing as absolute security (meaning continuous, constant, total, complete and unqualified protection and safety of a given asset) – any security system or strategy can be compromised given sufficient motivation, opportunity and resources.  So, since security breaches can occur even when adequate and sufficient security exists, then the primary purpose of any security strategy is to control as many variables as possible to limit the opportunity for criminal acts to the extent reasonably possible, i.e., make it as difficult as possible for crime to occur successfully. 

 

Except for crimes of passion (which generally occur spontaneously), criminals usually seek 2 conditions when deciding how/when/where to commit a crime:  environment/circumstances which allow greatest probability of the criminal act succeeding; and environment/circumstances which allow greatest probability of committing the criminal act without being stopped, caught or identified.  This means that criminals generally choose the circumstances and places which provide the greatest opportunity for successful accomplishment of the crime – they choose a place which has an “environment conducive to criminality.”

As noted above, every place is different and has different conditions to consider when determining security needs.  But regardless of place or conditions, an “environment conducive to criminality” usually has some common traits:

• no formal or careful consideration has been given to security needs (nothing has been done to assure that appropriate security measures have been implemented commensurate with foreseeable threats)
• no formalized security plan exists (security measures, if any even exist, have been chosen and applied haphazardly with no formal strategy or objective)
• area has easy access (a place which has a perimeter which cannot readily be secured or which has access controls which can be easily defeated)
• area is unkempt (making it difficult to determine if something is missing or providing places to hide or move furtively)
• area is dark (a place where crime can occur undetected and persons cannot be readily seen or identified)
• area is not routinely surveilled either by technological means (such as cameras) or persons (a place where crime can occur undetected and persons cannot be readily seen or identified)
• area has no regulatory or warning signage prominently displayed (information is not provided to advise patrons of proper or prohibited behaviors, to publicize security measures as a deterrent to inappropriate/criminal activity, and/or to warn of the penalties for engaging in inappropriate/criminal activity)
• there is no ready security response when problems occur (no plan is in place or competent personnel available to deal with inappropriate persons or activities)
• employees, even those ostensibly having security responsibilities, are not selected or trained properly (personnel are not competent to identify suspicious persons or respond to inappropriate/criminal activity)
• records/documentation related to security are not maintained (history of security issues is not kept or reviewed to ascertain that security measures are adequate and sufficient)
• security is not given adequate management attention (nothing is routinely done to assure that security measures are adequate and sufficient for current or changing security needs)

In summary and conclusion:  When a place fails to identify its security needs and fails to take reasonable steps to provide reasonable security, the result is usually a place where persons go to engage in inappropriate and criminal activities with little concern for being stopped, identified or caught  – a place with an “environment conducive to criminality”.

The Lesson from Benghazi

The tragic – and apparently avoidable – death of an Ambassador and 3 other officials is another grim reminder of both an endemic and systemic problem:  the United States is a reactive country.  And this is a significant problem for both national security strategy and business security.  Loss of life is certainly far more important than the loss of physical or intellectual assets, but the underlying principle is basically the same:  we fail to provide adequate security.

 

As a nation and in the business sector, we tend to be more reactionary than proactive – we have a long history of “not closing the barn door until after the horse has run off.”  We believe that bad things can happen, but only somewhere else or to somebody else;  and even when we recognize that something bad may happen, we rarely expect the worst-case scenario to occur.  We tend to look only at the immediate past for the information with which we make our decisions regarding the immediate future.    So when there are few actual, everyday problems or incidents, security becomes an afterthought and again becomes relegated to the status of “necessary evil.”

 

We fail to recognize that the law of averages and the intent of our enemies will ultimately affect everybody. We rely on our God or Lady Luck or whatever to keep us safe from “the big one.” The security assessors and planners are always viewed as the naysayers,  the ones who bring negativism to the table because, while everybody else is talking about peace and détente and political correctness, the person charged with looking for the bad things will raise his hand and ask “...But what if...?”  And all the shaking heads will turn in that person's direction and his views will be looked on as the ramblings of someone who isn't really with the team or on the bandwagon because "...those things just won't happen to us." But they can...and they will...and they usually do happen.

 

The major cause for having inadequate security is readily apparent:  the people who do the security assessments and create the security plans (in other words, the people who are the most likely to know what to expect) are never the ones in complete control of security. Responsible and accountable and scapegoat-able, yes. In control, no. Why? Because someone else always controls the decision to implement the plans and policies, the money and the resources. Some bureaucrat or executive always has to look at what the security readiness plan will entail and cost and determine – usually in a completely uninformed way – if the imposition of inconvenience and expenditure is really worthwhile, and if the funds and other resources are really most wisely spent on something that may never happen.  So with this fiscal attitude, bolstered by our naïve and erroneous belief that it can't happen to us, the will and the money and the resources we need for truly adequate security are never in place when we need them most – preferably before, but at least at the beginning of some disaster.  And we suffer again.  Needlessly.

 

Both our nation and the business world need to recognize the importance and value of security.  Our post-9/11 world,  coupled with the realities of today’s economy, makes the practice and implementation of adequate security a virtual necessity.  No longer can the protection of our people and our assets be relegated to good fortune and happenchance.  Rather, a systematic approach to assure that everything reasonable is being done to guarantee our nation’s and our business organizations’ safety and financial well-being is of vital and strategic importance.  And the marketing and selling of the concept of adequate protective efforts is a job that must be continually and relentlessly pursued by security professionals, since bureaucrats and executives are most often concerned only with the things that undermine the ability to provide good security.

A Lesson from the Past

I think the adage “If no order, chaos” is truly applicable in the security world – not necessarily to the security function per se, but to the overall concept of security, loss prevention and asset protection within business organizations.

I am old enough to remember the days when order and discipline was the rule of thumb in the business world:  Executives set goals and broad strategies; management made policies and rules to support and implement the strategies; and employees were expected – nay, REQUIRED – to follow and implement the rules and procedures and policies.  Each of those three tiers had its inherent authority, responsibility and accountability.  If a particular person in a particular tier did not properly exercise his role, he would be disciplined – formal discipline on his record, or demotion, or termination.  Everybody clearly understood his particular defined role in the organization, its concomitant responsibilities, and the penalties for failure.  Supervisors and managers were responsible for assuring compliance – they actually supervised and managed.  This was the very concept and essence of ORDER.

In those days, there was far less opportunity for internal security problems within a business organization because there was a defined system of checks and balances, and there were people in place to assure that the system functioned properly and successfully.  The thought and belief was “Even if Big Brother (i.e., Security) was not watching, my boss was.”  I had to perform and behave, or I’d be gone.

Today, that scenario does not exist.  Everybody does everything, so nothing really gets done thoroughly or correctly (another true adage:  “When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible”).  Executives don’t have time to formulate sound goals and strategies because they’re too busy and worried about what is now the end-all and be-all of business: next week’s profits.  So management muddles along, trying to support the executives’ “goal” of next week’s profits.  And the employees do whatever their job-of-the-day happens to be.  EVERYONE gets frustrated.  There is NO sound management or supervision.  So there is lots of time and opportunity to devise devious schemes for “getting my fair share” and doing things in the easiest, simplest way possible, which results in errors and mistakes and an I-don’t-care attitude.   This is the very concept and essence of CHAOS.

Some organizations still focus primarily on “old” security ideas like preventing, mitigating and managing external problems.  But that is because there was a time when focusing on external problems (like theft, trespassing, vandalism, bad checks and credit cards, etc.) was pretty much the sole extent and focus of the security function because there just weren’t that many other issues for Security to be concerned about, because when there was ORDER the internal systems worked and resulted in efficiency, correctness…and low levels of loss.

But now in the land of CHAOS there are many more things to be concerned about in terms of protecting an organization, many (most?) of which are internal, because Security has been charged with cleaning up the mess created by the broken systems that were broken by someone else.  And in order to fix this pervasive problem, we have to first repair the broken windows before we can make sure that they don’t get broken again.

Oh for the simple life of the past……

Value of a Diverse Background

When selecting an organizational security executive, an independent security consultant or a security expert witness, the nature and diversity of the individual’s background should be given thoughtful and careful consideration.

In general, security professionals should have practical rather than (or at least in addition to) theoretical experience. While a knowledge of security concepts and theories is helpful and necessary, it is generally more valuable for a person who will manage or review security operations to have “…been there, done that.” In other words, a professional who has actually worked with the principles he is expected to administer or review (a practitioner) generally brings a more comprehensive perspective than someone who has only studied the principles in theory (a researcher or academician).

In addition, many organizations feel that a person with public law enforcement experience will necessarily make a good security executive, but then do not take into account the nature of the law enforcement experience. With the inherent difference between law enforcement and security – a reactive mindset vs. a proactive mindset – it is important to assure that the law enforcement candidate being considered has some practical experience with the kinds of activities most likely to be encountered in the business setting. This concept holds true in the selection of an independent consultant or expert witness.

As an example, my professional background is unique because it brings a practical knowledge of my field from 3 distinct perspectives: I have served as a Director of Security for 3 organizations, assessing security needs from a subjective standpoint, developing, implementing and managing security programs; I have served as an independent Security Consultant to a wide variety of private and public sector organizations assessing security needs from an objective standpoint, recommending strategies for risk mitigation; and I regularly serve as a court-recognized Security Expert, evaluating adequacy and sufficiency of security programs and operations from a forensic standpoint.

Diverse experience guarantees both broad knowledge and analytical insight.

Process for Conducting Security Assessments

I don’t believe in using anyone else’s form or template for conducting security assessments – each consultant or manager who conducts such assessments has a unique style coupled with his own knowledge and experience; so, as with many things related to security, a “one-size-fits-all” approach usually doesn’t work. But other groups (such as ASIS International and the Federal protective Service) do have some great ideas, so I have incorporated some of those ideas into the forms and procedures that I personally developed for my own use.

In general, I use several background/ “inventory” forms to generate basic information about the grounds/campus, physical facilities, administrative/operational business components, and policies/procedures of the organization for which I am doing the assessment. I have these filled out to the extent possible by organizational representatives prior to my physical inspections/interviews. I then personally conduct a site inspection (to verify all information developed via the background/ “inventory” forms and to assure that nothing important was overlooked), conduct personal and focus group interviews, and review all relevant policies/procedures for adequacy and sufficiency. Finally, I compile all information along with my analyses and recommendations into a narrative report which is the final work product.

During my career this process, along with my experience in serving as a Court-recognized Expert Witness, has confirmed by belief that every place has to be assessed and analyzed separately and independently to fulfill the legal standard for adequate and sufficient security – namely, reasonable security at a particular place and time, under a particular set of circumstances, based on reasonable foreseeability; and thus my process which combines self-developed tools for gathering information along with objective analysis according to the needs and culture of each particular project assures that my assessments are personalized for each client.

I have been using this process for the past 25+ years, and it has served me well.

Preparing for Testimony

Practitioners in the security industry may occasionally be called on to provide testimony in some legal proceeding (either a criminal or civil case; during a deposition or at trial; as a fact witness or an expert). While those practitioners who have served as case consultants and/or expert witnesses will probably have had testimony experience, other security personnel may be faced with giving testimony for the first time. Regardless of the inherent knowledge or expertise of a witness, he/she still needs to be credible, effective and persuasive to the Judge and/or jury. To this end, preparation of the witness is very important.

Each attorney has a unique style and strategy and will undoubtedly have an established procedure for prepping witnesses. But here are a few issues that should be considered by anyone preparing to testify:

(1)  One issue that is sometimes overlooked in the preparation of a witness is the fact that he can only respond to the questions asked (a good witness can sometimes find a way to include additional information, but not always). So close collaboration with counsel is very important, not only to prepare for testimony expected during direct examination at trial, but for anticipated cross-examination. There needs to be a clear understanding and agreement of what information needs to be conveyed, the best manner to convey it, and the best manner to counteract aggressive cross examination, including attacks on both personal credibility and the credibility of testimony.

(2)  Even if not specifically demanded in the deposition or trial subpoena, availability of any relevant case materials/files is a good idea. Specific information such as dates, times and/or other technical information is likely to be a subject at issue, so it is better to refer to notes than to give erroneous information which may later be challenged or used to impeach the witness.

(3)  Answering questions “yes” or “no,” or at least as briefly as possible, is always a good idea. But when such a brief answer is not sufficient – such as when additional clarification or expansion is necessary – it is often best not to begin the answer with “yes” or “no” (such as “Yes, but…”) because an experienced attorney may not allow the “but” portion. Rather, it is sometimes better to begin a longer answer with a qualifying statement such as “Unfortunately, that question cannot be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’, ” then go on with the full answer.

(4)  It is usually helpful for a witness to be advised of the personality and usual strategies/tactics of the opposing attorney. This helps the witness to better prepare for the demeanor and “personality” of the anticipated proceeding (for example, knowing that a particular attorney focuses just as much on the witness’s background as he does on specific case issues). Knowing what to expect from a particular attorney is a great asset for testimony preparation.

(5)  A witnesses should pause briefly before giving any answer, to allow his attorney the opportunity to object before potentially damaging or unnecessary information is inadvertently given.

Testifying in any legal proceeding is often a stressful and challenging ordeal. So having as much information as possible about what to expect, and being as prepared as possible, goes a long way towards doing a thorough, competent and professional job.

"Absolute" vs. "Perfect" Security

“Absolute security” and “perfect security” are not one and the same – the terms are not synonymous. And let’s be clear from the outset: There is no absolute security; and while perfect security may be hypothetically possible at any given moment in time, long-term perfect security is also not possible.

First, some working definitions: Absolute security is the theoretical state of total, complete and unqualified protection and safety of a given asset (some specific person, place or thing, including intellectual “things”). Perfect security is the practical state of utilizing the most appropriate security measures and strategies for a given asset at a given moment in time to protect against immediate, specific threats. A subtle but important difference.

From another perspective: Absolute security would protect against any conceivable or possible threat at all times. This condition simply cannot exist: No security program or strategy can ever totally assure that assets will not be lost or that a legal challenge to security efficacy will not be successful. Depending on a number of uncontrollable variables – such as the commitment, motivation, resources and persistence of an attacker; the inexplicable failure of a protective measure at a crucial moment; or even the whims of a jury – the best security measures may sometimes fail or be deemed to be inadequate. Nothing can be done to assure that nothing will ever happen.

On the other hand, perfect security keeps whoever/whatever is being protected safe right now, from whatever threat is occurring right now. This is attainable, albeit for limited periods of time because situations and conditions change constantly and continuously, and that which is adequate and sufficient right now may not be adequate and sufficient in a few minutes or hours or days. The best that can be hoped for – and what those responsible for security should strive for – is to control as many facets of the security strategy as possible for the longest time possible, and to monitor the strategy continually to assure that emerging threats and unanticipated failures can be best and most expediently mitigated.

As with most issues related to security, one should hope for the best while planning for the worst.